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THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT: BOTTLENECKS TO 
INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN 
THE ROME STATUTE 
REMIGIUS ORAEKI CHIBUEZE* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On July 17, 1998, members of the international community that con-
verged at the United Nations (UN) Diplomatic Conference of Plenipoten-
tiaries (held in Rome, Italy, from June 15 to July 17, 1998) voted 120 to 
7 in favor of adopting the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC Statute).· The ICC Statute established a sui generis perma-
nent international criminal court and became the first multilateral legal 
document in recent years to detail the investigation and prosecution of 
* Attorney-at-Law and Counselor, State Bar of California; Solicitor & Advocate of the 
Supreme Court of Nigeria; S.1.D., LL.M., Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco; 
LL.M., University of Alberta, Canada; B.L. Nigerian Law School; LL.B (Hons), University of 
Benin, Nigeria. 
\. See The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. NCONF. 183/9 
(July 17, 1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998) [hereinafter ICC Statute]. The States that voted 
against the ICC Statute include the U.S., China, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, and IJbya. The U.S. and 
Israel signed the Statute on December 31,2000, and on May 6, 2002, and August 28, 2002, respec-
tively, informed the U.N. Secretary-General that they have no legal obligations arising from their 
signatures of the Rome Statute on December 31,2000. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the 
Secretary-General, available at 
<http://untreaty.un.orglEnglishlbiblelenglishinternetbiblelpartIlchapterXVIIIltreatyll.asp> (visited 
March 13, 2006) [hereinafter Multilateral Treaties]. 
185 
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international crimes such as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity.2 
Also, the ICC Statute confinns and codifies the principle of individual 
criminal liability by unequivocally providing that a person who commits 
a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall be held individually 
responsible and liable for punishment.3 This principle, which was first 
propagated by the Nuremberg tribunal, evidences the recognition by the 
international community that gathered at the Rome Conference4 that 
crimes against international law are committed by individuals, not ab-
stract entities and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes 
can the provisions of international law be enforced.5 
According to the Statute of the ICC, the Court was established to ensure 
that "the most serious crimes of concern to the international community 
as a whole must not go unpunished."6 Also, the ICC was created to real-
ize the determination of the international community "to put an end to 
impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes, and thus to contribute to 
the prevention of such crimes."7 Therefore, it is the hopeful expectation 
of supporters of the Court that it serves as "a deterrent to future interna-
2. ICC Statute, supra note I, art. 5(1). The Court may exercise jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression when "a provision is adopted in accordance with Articles 121 and 123 defining the crime 
and setting out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this 
crime." /d. art. 5(2). Also, terrorism and drug related crimes were adopted into the text in an an-
nexed resolution and will become part of the crimes under the Court's jurisdiction once it is defined 
at a review conference in the future. See Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Annex I, Res. E, U.N. 
Doc. NCONF.183110 (1998). Under this process, the earliest time aggression, terrorism and drug 
related crimes could be included in the Court's jurisdiction as a crime is seven years after the statute 
entered into force. See ICC Statute, supra note I, arts. 121, 123, detailing the process of amending 
the ICC Statute. 
3. /d. art. 27. 
4. About 160 countries and a wide representation of non-governmental organizations partici-
pated in the Rome Conference. For a complete list of states and organizations represented at the 
Conference, see Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. AlCONF.183110, Annex 
II, ill (1998). 
5. See International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg) Judgment and Sentences, 41 A.J.I.L. 172, 
220-21 (1947). 
6. ICC Statute, supra note I, preamble, para. 4. 
7. Jd. preamble, para. 5. The United Nations also suggested that the Court was needed to 
inter alia, "to achieve justice for all," "to end impunity," "to help end conflicts," "to remedy the 
deficiencies of ad hoc tribunals," "to take over when national criminal justice institutions are unwill-
ing or unable to act," and ''to deter future war criminals." See Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court - Overview, available at: <http://www.un.orgllaw/icc/generaVoverview.htm> (vis-
ited on March 6, 2006). 
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tional crimes, a contributor to stable international order, and a reaffirma-
tion of internationallaw."g 
The establishment of the ICC and the entry into force of the ICC Statute 
on July 1, 2002,9 129 years after the idea was first suggested in 1872 by 
Gustave Moynier, a Swiss diplomat and one of the founders of the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross lO was one of the remarkable 
achievements of the twentieth century. However, the understandable 
euphoria surrounding the establishment of the ICC obscured the fact that 
many compromises that were necessary to reach a successful conclusion 
significantly diluted the original aspirations. The reality is that the ICC 
Statute cut down on the ability of the Court to exercise jurisdiction 
through the principle of complementarity. The ICC could act only in 
those cases where States were unwilling or unable to investigate or 
prosecute the accused. The Prosecutor could not act without prior ap-
proval of the Pre-trial Chamber. Also, absent UN Security Council ac-
tion, the Court can only exercise jurisdiction after it has passed through 
the layer of procedural rules requiring the Prosecutor to obtain the con-
sent of either the State on whose territory the crime is committed or the 
State of nationality of the accused. I I Furthermore, the UN Security 
Council has authority to halt prosecutions if, in its opinion, such prosecu-
tion will not be compatible with its responsibilities under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter. 12 
This paper highlights some of the inherent bottlenecks in the exercise of 
ICC jurisdiction that may diminish the Court's ability to uphold the prin-
ciple of individual criminal liability. In particular, this paper will ana-
lyze the principle of complementarity between the ICC and States Parties 
to the ICC Statute. Additionally, the legality of the so called Article 98 
Immunity Agreement will be discussed. This paper without equivocation 
contends that the conclusion of Article 98 immunity agreement by ICC 
States Parties is a clear violation of their obligation to cooperate with the 
Court and to arrest and surrender suspects to the Court. Preceding the 
8. Alison McIntire, Be Careful What You Wish for Because You Just Might Get It: The United 
States and the International Criminal Court, 25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 249, 259 (2001). 
9. Id. art. 126, provides that the Statute shall come into force when ratified by 60 countries. 
By the end of June 2002, more than 60 States had ratified the Statute and as of March 2006, about 
139 States had signed the Statute and 100 of those States had ratified it. See also, Multilateral Trea-
ties, supra note I. 
10. Gustave Moynier, Note sur la creation d'une institution judicia ire intemationale proper a 
prevenir et a rep rimer les infractions a la Convention de Geneve, BUllETIN INTERNATIONAL DES 
SOCIETES DE SECOURS Aux MILITAIRES BLESSES, No. 11, Apr. 1872, at 122, translated in Christo-
pher Keith Hall, The First Proposal for a Permanent International Criminal Court, 322 INT'L REv. 
RED CROSS 57, 72 (1998). 
11. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 12. 
12. Id. art. 16. 
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discussion on the bottlenecks in Court jurisdiction is a brief discussion of 
the provisions of the ICC Statute regarding individual criminal responsi-
bility. 
In conclusion, this paper will argue that while the establishment of the 
ICC is one of the remarkable events of the twentieth century, the high-
lighted obstacles are capable of restricting the reach and effectiveness of 
the ICC as an institution designed to bring an end to the culture of impu-
nity. Consequently, this paper advocates the elimination of said bottle-
necks. 
II. THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL 
RESPONSffiILITY 
The principle of individual criminal responsibility is fIrmly established in 
Part ill of the ICC Statute. Generally, it provides that an individual is 
criminally responsible for his or her conduct. 13 The individual's criminal 
responsibility extends to the commission of the crime, whether as an 
individual or as a group, and includes ordering, soliciting or inducing the 
commission of a crime that in fact occurs or is attempted; or facilitating 
the commission of a crime, or aiding, abetting or otherwise assisting in 
its commission or attempted commission. 14 Also, individual criminal 
responsibility attaches in other ways, for instance, where the individual 
intentionally contributes to the commission or the attempted commission 
of a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose, when 
that contribution is made with the "aim of furthering the criminal activity 
or criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involves 
the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court," or is 
"made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the 
crime."15 
In cases of genocide, an individual would also have criminal responsibil-
ity for direct and public incitement. 16 Further, an individual is criminally 
liable for attempting to commit a crime so long as the individual has 
taken substantial steps toward commission of the crime, even if the crime 
does not occur because of circumstances independent of the individual's 
intention. 17 However, a timely withdrawal resulting in complete and 
13. ICC Statute, supra note I, art. 25(3). 
14. [d. art. 25(3)(a-c). 
15. [d. art. 25(3)(d). 
16. /d. art. 25(3)(e). 
17. /d. art. 25(3)(0. 
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voluntary abandonment of the criminal purpose shall excuse punishment 
under the Statute. IS 
The Court's jurisdiction extends to all persons regardless of their official 
capacity.19 This means that any member of Government or Head of State 
shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC.20 Therefore, the official 
position of the individual, or any immunity or special procedural rules 
that may attach to the individual because of his or her official capacity, 
will not bar the jurisdiction of the COurt.21 In essence, national 
amnesties, pardons or similar measures of impunity for crimes under the 
Court's jurisdiction, which prevent the discovery of the truth and prevent 
accountability in a criminal trial, cannot bind the Court.22 
However, it is not unlikely that the Court may consider the outcome of 
credible alternative measures of accountability such as the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission. The Court may do this before or after the 
completion of investigation, if the Prosecutor, taking into account all 
circumstances including the gravity of the crimes, the interests of vic-
tims, and other strategic factors,23 determines that it is not "in the inter-
ests of justice" to investigate or prosecute.24 According to Judge Kau, 
this question is not simply theoretical because the "Prosecutor operates in 
the context of ongoing conflicts, often at the same time as peace negotia-
tions are taking place, purely legal considerations may not always be the 
sole basis for deciding whether or not to prosecute."25 The Trial Cham-
ber may, on its own initiative, review the Prosecutor's decision not to 
18. Id. 
19. See id. art. 27(1) which provides that the Statute: 
shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity. In 
particular, official capacity whether as a Head of State or ...... [any other capacity] shall 
in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in 
and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. art. 27(2). Article 27 (2) provides that: "lrrununities or special procedural rules which 
may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not 
bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person." 
22. Amnesty International, The International Criminal Coun: Checklist for Effective 
Implementation 6, AI Index: lOR 40101112000, I August 2000, available at: 
<http://web.arnnesty.orgllibrary/indexlengior400112000?open&of=eng-385> [hereinafter Checklist 
for Effective Implementation]. 
23. Hans-Peter Kaul, Developments at the International Criminal Coun: Construction Site For 
More Justice: The International Criminal Coun After Two Years, 99 A.J.l.L. 370, 375 (2005) (ob-
serving that examples of factors that might be considered are the protection of victims, the potential 
impact of investigations on the conflict in question, and the question of the existence of national 
criminal prosecution initiatives). 
24. ICC Statute, supra note I, arts. 53(1)(c), 53(2)(c). See also, Annex to the "Paper on Some 
Policy Issues Before the Office of the Prosecutor": Referrals and Communications I (Apr. 23, 2004) 
[hereinafter Paper on Some Policy Issues]. 
25. Hans-Peter Kau, supra note 23, at 375. Judge Kaul is a Judge of the International Criminal 
Court, and President of the Pre-Trial Division. 
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proceed with an investigation or prosecution on the grounds that it will 
not serve the interest of justice.26 
Regarding command responsibility, the ICC Statute provides that com-
mand responsibility is a form of criminal responsibility in addition to 
other forms of responsibility and that military commanders are not im-
mune from responsibility for the acts of their subordinates.27 Also, 
command responsibility extends to any superior in a nonmilitary set-
ting.28 Thus, Article 28 deals with the responsibility of military com-
manders and other superiors with respect to the criminal acts of subordi-
nates under their "effective authority and control."29 The military com-
mander or other superior is liable if he or she knew or should have 
known that his or her subordinates were committing or about to commit 
crimes prohibited by the Statute and failed to take reasonable steps to 
"prevent or repress ... or to submit the matter to the competent authori-
ties."30 
The ICC Statute prohibits both "superior orders" and "prescription of 
law" as grounds for excluding criminal responsibility, unless (1) the per-
son was under a legal obligation to obey such orders, (2) the person did 
not know that the order was unlawful, and (3) the order was not mani-
festly unlawfupl The application of this exception is limited because the 
ICC Statute makes it clear that orders to commit genocide or crimes 
against humanity are manifestly unlawful.32 
Also, mental incapacity as a result of mental disease or defect, involun-
tary intoxication, self defense, defense of others and defense of property 
essential for survival during war times, as well as duress are grounds for 
excluding criminal responsibility.33 Also, mistake of fact or law may be 
grounds to exclude criminal responsibility if it negates the mental ele-
ment required by the crime.34 However, "superior orders" and "prescrip-
tion of law" are not grounds for excluding criminal responsibility unless 
the person was under a legal obligation to obey such orders, the person 
26. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 53, para. 3(b); Regulations of the Court, Reg. 48, Doc. ICC-
BD/01-01-04 (May 26,2004) [hereinafter ICC Regulations]. 
27. Jd. art. 28(a). 
28. Jd. art. 28(b). 
29. Jd. The words "effective authority and control" are intended to superimpose in a civilian 
setting the requirements of the same types of relationships between superior and subordinate in the 
military. 
30. Jd. 
31. Jd. art. 33(l)(a-c) (emphasis in the original). 
32. Jd. art. 33(2) 
33. /d. art. 31. 
34. Jd. art. 32. 
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did not know that the order was unlawful, and the order was not mani-
festly unlawful,35 The exception offers little or no defense as orders to 
commit genocide, or crimes against humanity, or war crimes are gener-
ally manifestly unlawful.36 
m. BOTTLENECKS IN THE EXERCISE OF ICC JURISDICTION 
A. THE COMPLEMENTARITY PRINCIPLE 
The principle of complementarity which permeates the ICC Statute con-
fers jurisdictional primacy on national courts over the ICC. 37 In other 
words, the Court has no jurisdiction over a case when the matter "is be-
ing appropriately dealt with by a national justice system."38 National 
sovereignty led to the introduction of the principle of complementarity in 
the operation of the ICC. 39 Article 17 provides that the ICC will defer its 
jurisdiction to a national court except in situations where national courts 
have been genuinely unable or unwilling to investigate and/or prosecute 
the accused.40 Article 17 is applicable even when the State's leaders are 
themselves implicated.41 
The Prosecutor is duty-bound to notify all States that might normally 
exercise jurisdiction of his or her intention to commence an investiga-
tion.42 Thereupon, any State with jurisdiction over the case, whether a 
State Party or not, may within one month of receipt of such notice inform 
the Court that it is investigating or has investigated the situation domesti-
cally.43 Such notice may be accompanied with a request that the Prosecu-
tor stop his or her own investigation in the case.44 On receipt of the re-
quest, the Prosecutor must defer to the State's investigation, but may still 
35. ICC Statute, supra note I, art. 33 (emphasis added). 
36. [d. art. 33(2). 
37. [d. preamble, para. 10, arts. I, 17. (Article I of the Statute provides that the Court shall 
have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international 
concern, as referred to in this Statute, and shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdiction). 
38. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCfION To THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 85 
(2nd ed. 2004). 
39. See David J. Scheffer, Staying the Course with the International Criminal Court, 35 
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 47, 59-60 (Nov. 200l-Feb. 2(02) (noting that Article 17 was ostensibly drafted 
to accommodate and protect the United States' interest). 
40. ICC Statute, supra note I, art. 17(a). 
41. [d. art. 28. 
42. [d. art. 18(1). 
43. [d. art 18(2). 
44. The request must be made in writing and must contain information regarding the State's 
investigation. See, ICC, Rules of Procedure and Evidence (adopted by the Assembly of States 
Parties, First Session, New York, 3-10 Sept. 2(02), U.N. Doc. PCNICCl2000/l/Add. I, ICC-
ASP/1I3, Rules 53 & 54, available at: 
<http://www.icc-cpi.intllibrary/aboutlofficialjournal/Rules_oCProc_and_Evid_070704-EN.pdf> 
(visited March 3, 2006). 
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make an application to the Pre-Trial Chamber which may decide to au-
thorize the investigation.45 To the extent that the Prosecutor has no 
choice in the matter but to comply, "the 'request is really not a request. 
It is a demand or an assertion by the State of its right to primacy." '46 
Therefore, the complementarity notion in the ICC Statute replaces the 
primary jurisdiction of international tribunals as was the case with ad hoc 
tribunals such as the Nuremberg47 and Toky048 war tribunals, the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia49 (ICTY), the In-
ternational Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda50 (lCTR), as well as the mixed 
tribunals in Sierra Leone, Timore-Leste, and Cambodia with priority for 
national courtS.51 This deference to national courts suggestively makes 
the ICC a court of last resort.52 
Thus, under the complementarity provision, any State with jurisdiction 
can effectively prevent the ICC from exercising jurisdiction over its na-
tionals by informing the Court of its willingness to investigate the allega-
tion under Article 18(2).53 In the event that the Pre-trial Chamber rejects 
such a request, Article 18(4) allows the requesting State to appeal an 
adverse ruling of the Pre-trial Chamber to the Appeals Chamber.54 In 
45. ICC Statute, supra note I, art. 18(2). 
46. See Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko, Article 18 Preliminary Rulings Regarding Admissibility, in 
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' 
NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 395, 401 (Otto Triffterer, ed. 1999) [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE 
ROME STATUTE]. 
47. The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg was established by an agreement be-
tween four victorious Allied Powers at the end of World War II. See Agreement for the Prosecution 
and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945,59 Stat. 1544, 82 
U.N.T.S. 279, reprinted in 39 AJ.I.L. 257 (1945) [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter]. 
48. The International Military Tribunal for the Far East was established in Tokyo pursuant to 
the Special Proclamation by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers at Tokyo, Establish-
ment of an International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589, 4 
BEVANS 20. 
49. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, annexed to 
S.c. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/827 (May 25,1993), reprinted 
in 32 ILM 1192 (1993). 
50. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, annexed to S.C. Res. 955, U.N. 
SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. SlRES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994), reprinted in 33 ILM 1602 
(1994). 
51. See Bartram S. Brown, Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of 
National Courts and International Criminal Tribunals, 23 YALE J. lNT'L L. 383, 385 (1998) (noting 
that ICTY and ICTR raised for the first time the appropriate relationship between the jurisdiction of 
national courts and that of an international criminal court which was clearly to resolve the jurisdic-
tional conflict in favor of the International Tribunal). 
52. John Seguin, Denouncing the International Criminal Court: An Examination of u.s. Ob-
jections to the Rome Statute 18 B.U. INT'L LJ. 85, 94 (2000); James L. Taulbee, A Call to Arms 
Declined: The United States and the International Criminal Court, 14 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 105, 
129 (2000). 
53. ICC Statute, supra note I, art 18(2). 
54. Id. art 18(4). 
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addition, under Article 18(7) a State which has challenged a ruling of the 
Pre-trial Chamber may challenge the admissibility of the case under Ar-
ticle 19 on grounds of additional significant facts or significant change of 
circumstances.55 With these arrangements, the possibility that the ICC 
would exercise its jurisdiction without hindrance from one State or the 
other is exceedingly remote because no State will wish the Court to 
remove a case from its jurisdiction where it intended to conduct the 
investigation and prosecution itself.56 
In view of this development, the complementarity provisions have wa-
tered down the jurisdiction of the Court and created an avenue whereby a 
State may use the complementarity provisions to shield its nationals from 
the Court's jurisdiction.57 The Security Council referral ofthe situation in 
Darfur, Sudan exposes this concern as it promises to test the effect of 
such a referral. Already, the Sudanese Government has left no one in 
doubt that it has no intention of cooperating with the Court and will not 
surrender any of their nationals to the Court regarding this referraJ.58 
Thus, after the referral, the Government of Sudan created a special court 
to prosecute individuals suspected of perpetrating crimes in Darfur. 
The Sudanese Government has not made any pretension as to its inten-
tions in creating the special court. Indeed, as an official of the Sudanese 
Ministry of Justice averred, "ICC Article 17 stipulates that it can refuse 
to look into any case if investigations and trials can be carried out in the 
countries concerned except if they are unwilling to carry out the prosecu-
tions."59 Consequently, the Sudanese Government has gone ahead to 
55. Id. art. 19(2) (b), provides that Challenges to the admissibility of a case under Article 17 or 
challenges to the jurisdiction of the Court may be made by a State which has jurisdiction over a case, 
on the ground that it is investigating or prosecuting the case or has investigated or prosecuted the 
case. 
56. Id. 
57. Jimmy Gurule, United States Opposition to the 1998 Rome Statute Establishing an Inter-
national Criminal Court: Is the Court's Jurisdiction Truly Complementary to National Criminal 
Jurisdictions?, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. I (2002). 
58. See, ICC Delegation to Visit Sudan's Darfur, SUDAN TRmuNE, February 27, 2006, avail-
able at: <http://www.sudantribune.comlArticle.php3?id_Article=14271> (reporting that the Sudan's 
Justice Minister Mohamed aI-Mardi told Reuters in an interview on Dec. 13, 2005 that Moreno 
Ocampo's investigators would not have any access to Darfur, where ethnic cleansing has resulted in 
killings, rape and the uprooting of 2 million refugees. The paper quoted the Justice Minster as saying 
that ''the ICC officials have no jurisdiction inside the Sudan or with regards to Sudanese citizens," 
and that ''they cannot investigate anything on Darfur."). 
59. See Wim van Cappellen, Sudan: Judiciary Challenge ICC over Darfur Cases, 
INTEGRATED REGIONAL INFO. NETWORKS, June 24, 2005 (reporting that the Sudanese Council of 
Ministers avowed a total rejection of Security Council Resolution 1593 and that Sudan's Justice 
Minister, Ali Mohamed Osamn Yassin, has been quoted by local media as stating that the new 
domestic institution would be a substitute to the International Criminal Court). 
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allegedly prosecute some security officials over the Darfur conflict.60 
This contrasts with the position of the UN Special Rapporteur on Sudan, 
who has argued that the special court is not able to try Sudanese officials 
responsible for violating international crimes in Darfur.61 Therefore, the 
alleged prosecution is nothing but a charade to shield Sudanese nationals 
from the reach of the Court by taking advantage of Article 17. 
In situations like this, the Court can only assume jurisdiction if it deter-
mines that the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the 
investigation or prosecution.62 The ICC Statute provides guidelines on 
how to determine the "unwillingness"63 or "inability" 64 of a State to con-
duct an investigation or prosecution. However, the word "genuinely" is 
not defined by the ICC Statute but appears to evoke a requirement of 
good faith on behalf of the State.65 In other words, a State should not 
proceed to conduct an investigation for the sole purpose of depriving the 
Court of its jurisdiction without a good faith belief in its willingness, or a 
good faith assessment of its ability, to conduct the investigation or prose-
cution. 
60. See, Agence France Presse, Sudan Hands UN Darfur Suspects List, SUDAN 
TRmUNE,February 26, 2006, available at: 
<http://www.sudantribune.comlArticle.php3?id_Article=14276> (reporting that the head of the 
Governmental Human Rights Advisory Council (HRAC) Abdel Monim Osman Taha Gave a UN 
official in charge of human rights in the Sudan, Sima Samar, a list individuals of the regular services 
who have been tried for perpetrating crimes connected with the Darfur conflict). 
61. Reuters, Sudan UlUlble to Try Darfur Suspects - UN Official, REUTERS,March 6, 2006, 
available at: <http://www.a1ertnet.orglthenews/newsdesklMCD652175.htrn> (quoting Sima Samar, 
the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Sudan to the effect that "Sudan's special court for Darfur is not able 
to try Sudanese officials responsible for war crimes and authorities continue to abuse freedom of 
expression." Ms. Samar said the courts had not yet tried anyone with command responsibility for 
crimes in Darfur and that she had only been given a list of 15 officers from the police and army who 
had been tried for crimes between 1991 and 2003, before the Darfur conflict even began. "We did 
ask for information and they didn't provide much information so that means that maybe they are not 
able to bring anybody to justice," she said). 
62. ICC Statute, supra note I, art. 17(1)(a)(b). 
63. [d. art 17(2) provides that a State is unwilling if one or more of the following situations is 
applicable: 
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision was made for 
the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court referred to in Article 5; 
(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the circumstances is 
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice; 
(c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or impartially, 
and they were or are being conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, is incon-
sistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice. 
64. See id. art. 17(3) provides that: 
In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall consider whether, due 
to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the State 
is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise un-
able to carry out its proceedings. 
65. Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New Inte17UltiolUll CrimilUll Court: An Un-
easy Revolution, 88 GEO. LJ. 381,418 (2000). 
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The process of determining whether a State is "unwilling" or "unable" to 
investigate or prosecute invites judicial review of the States's decision 
and/or its national judicial system. Ordinarily, States see judicial review 
of its national court decisions by an outside judicial organ as an unwel-
come challenge to its sovereignty. As such, it remains to be seen how 
States would respond to a decision by the Court that the State's decision 
not to investigate or prosecute was based on its inability or unwilling-
ness. Probably, a decision based on "inability" to investigate or prose-
cute may be easier to justify as it generally stems from a breakdown of, 
or unavailability of, institutions of legal enforcement.66 On the other 
hand, "unwillingness" to prosecute involves a deliberate decision of the 
State not to hold the accused person accountable.67 
It has been suggested that a State may be unable to prosecute if it lacks 
the required manpower and institutions to carry out a meaningful crimi-
nal prosecution.68 Such a situation could have arisen after the genocide in 
Rwanda, where very few lawyers and judges survived the 1994 massa-
cre.69 On the other hand, a State may be unwilling to prosecute a perpe-
trator if it demonstrates that it lacks the political will to do so. This may 
occur where the accused is a member of the State Government, or exerts 
influence over or accepts favors from those in Government. 
Certainly, the situation in Darfur fits into this latter category as the Gov-
ernment has been identified as an active Party in the crisis and has done 
nothing to disarm militias or end the "culture of impunity" there.70 The 
Human Rights Watch notes that "the Sudanese government's systematic 
attacks on civilians in Darfur have been accompanied by a policy of im-
punity for all those responsible for the crimes," and requests that 
"[s]enior Sudanese officials including President Omar EI Bashir must be 
held accountable for the campaign of ethnic cleansing in Darfur."7! 
66. ICC Statute, supra note I, art. 17(3). 
67. Id. art. 17(2). 
68. David Rider, Canadian Judge Pans New International Coun: Arbour Says Rules Shield 
World's Worst Criminals, THE OTTAWA CITIZEN, Jan. 21, 2002, at A7 (quoting Justice Louise 
Arbour of the Supreme Court of Canada and former ICTYIICTR prosecutor). 
69. Id. 
70. See Human Rights Watch Report, Entrenching Impunity Government Responsibility for 
International Crimes in Darfur, Dec. 12, 2005, Vol. 17, No. 17A available at: 
<http://hrw.orglreports/2oo5/darfurI2051>; (visited March 14, 2006) (documenting the role of more 
than a dozen named civilian and military officials in the use and coordination of "Janjaweed" mili-
tias and the Sudanese armed forces to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur 
since mid-2oo3). 
71. Human Rights Watch, UN: Put Sudan's Top Leaders on Sanctions List: ICC Should Inves-
tigate Darfur Officials, available at: <http://hrw.orglenglishldocsl2oo51l2/09/sudanI2186.htm> 
(visited March 14,2006) (quoting Peter Takirambudde, Africa director at Human Rights Watch). 
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Whether the Government and military officials of Sudan will be held 
accountable or will hide under Article 17 protection is anyone's guess. 
A related matter concerning Article 17 is that, under the guidelines for 
determining "unwillingness" or "inability" to prosecute or investigate, it 
is difficult to imagine a situation where an investigation or prosecution 
carried out by western countries with an advanced judicial system and 
history of criminal prosecution would be considered fraudulent. Devel-
oping countries, to the contrary, are less likely to benefit from the com-
plementarity provision since their legal systems and political climate 
could easily be judged unable or unwilling to undertake satisfactory and 
successful prosecutions. As has been observed by Justice Arbour, "states 
with relatively developed legal systems will have a 'major trump card' to 
evade justice and will clash with developing countries that don't."72 Jus-
tice Arbour rightly posits that such a clash will be intensely political and 
will risk the ICC becoming the true default jurisdiction for developing 
countries, while subjecting the Court to major political and legal battles 
with everyone else.73 This may result in the Court being viewed suspi-
ciously by developing countries - as a vestige of western countries -
thereby tainting the Court as an independent judicial institution.74 
While this paper questions the rationale for primary jurisdiction of na-
tional courts over the ICC, it nonetheless suggests that assessments con-
cerning a government's unwillingness to prosecute should not be based 
on lack of action in a single case, but rather on a systematic pattern of 
judicial inaction in pertinent cases.75 Where a judicial system is consid-
ered unable to conduct trials, the ICC should not concern itself with as-
suming jurisdiction; rather the international community should offer as-
sistance and training to overcome any shortcomings.76 In this way, the 
ICC would retain the integrity of developing governments' judicial sys-
tems. This is necessary, considering the fact that governments constitute 
72. David Rider, supra note 68. 
73. Id. (quoting Justice Louise Arbour). 
74. See, Fred Bridgland, Darfur Sanctions Deadlock as ICC Considers Prosecutions, 
INSTITUTE FOR WAR AND PEACE REPORTING (IWPR), Feb. 28, 2006, available at: 
<http://www.iwpr.neU?p=acr&s=f&0=259927&apc_state=henb> (visited Feb. 28, 2006) (reporting 
that the ICC's main work is so far concentrated on Darfur, northern Uganda and the lturi region of 
the Congo, and that this heavy concentration on one continent has perplexed many Mricans. They 
argue that it would have made public relations sense for such a new and important international court 
to have cast its net over several continents, including Europe from where it operates). 
75. See Wilton Park Conference, Towards Global Justice: Accountability and the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), Feb. 4-8, 2002, at <http://www.wiltonpark.org.uklweb/welcome.htrni> (last 
visited Feb. 18,2003). 
76. Id. 
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the courts' national partners, and their cooperation and compliance are 
integral to its functioning. 77 
Also, since States are likely to perceive the process by which the Court 
determines a State unable or unwilling to investigate or prosecute as a 
challenge to their sovereign powers, the Court is likely to refrain from 
making such determination.78 Conferring the Court with primary juris-
diction, ratione personae, over all cases within the Court's jurisdiction, 
ratione materiae, would avoid the need for the Court to judicially review 
a State's national legal system and avoid the likelihood that it would ab-
dicate its responsibility in order to avoid confrontation with a State anx-
ious to defend its sovereignty. 
As poignantly argued by the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY, jurisdic-
tional primacy is a functional necessity for an international criminal tri-
bunal.79 According to the Appeals tribunal: 
Indeed, when an international tribunal such as the present one is 
created, it must be endowed with primacy over national courts. 
Otherwise, human nature being what it is, there would be a per-
ennial danger of international crimes being characterized as "or-
dinary crimes" or proceedings being "designed to shield the ac-
cused," or cases not being diligently prosecuted. If not effec-
tively countered by the principle of primacy, anyone of those 
stratagems might be used to defeat the very purpose of the crea-
tion of an international criminal jurisdiction, to the benefit of the 
very people whom it has been designed to prosecute.80 
The Appeals Chamber rightly noted that States and/or their national 
courts may not be able to handle the trial of some high profile persons. 
For instance, in spite of the U.S. support, the Iraqi Special Tribunal has 
not been able to conduct a hitch free trial of Saddam Hussein and some 
77. [d. 
78. In a related development, the general approach followed by the Office of the Prosecutor 
with respect to its proprio motu powers indicates a clear preference for initiating investigations of 
alleged core crimes, wherever possible, on the basis of a referral by a State Party pursuant to Article 
14 or by the Security Council pursuant to Article 13(b). While this predilection does not mean, of 
course, that the Prosecutor will never exercise the authority to initiate investigations proprio motu, 
the Prosecutor seems inclined not to use these powers unless absolutely necessary, for example 
where states have failed to refer an objectively serious situation. See Paper on Some Policy Issues, 
supra note 24; Report of the Prosecutor of the ICC, Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Second Assembly of 
States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Sept. 8, 2003). 
79. Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1, P 58-59 (ICTY Oct. 2, 1995) (Appeal on Jurisdiction) 
[hereinafter Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appellate Decision on Jurisdiction]. 
80. [d. 
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members of his Baath PartyY The chaotic scenes that have marred the 
trial so far have prompted one commentator to suggest that the whole 
trial is being undermined and to observe: 
I think it was a big mistake that this trial was held in Iraq be-
cause the judge, you cannot find a person, one individual today 
in Iraq - judge, lawyer, prosecutor who is impartial vis-a-vis 
Saddam Hussein. Either they are with him or against him.82 
Therefore, the Court is in a better position to withstand the political pres-
sure associated with prosecuting high level individuals and avoid allega-
tions of unfairness that may be leveled against a State. The Court will 
also hold individuals to a worldwide standard of international justice.83 
This approach would promote universal and uniform individual criminal 
responsibility for the crimes concerned because any person accused of a 
core crime would normally be tried by the ICC, not by national COurtS.84 
81. Saddam Walks Out in Trial Uproar, BBC NEWS, January 29, 2006, available at 
<http://news.bbc.co.ukl2lhilmiddle3astl46S9274.stm>. 
82. Id. (referring to Saad Djebbar, an international lawyer and commentator on Middle East 
politics). 
83. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need to 
Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 11,60 (1997) (noting 
that "[a] pennanent system of international criminal justice based on a preexisting international 
criminal statute would allow any person from any nation to be held accountable for violations. Equal 
treatment for violators would be guaranteed."). 
84. See Amnesty International, International Criminal Court: The Failure Of States To Enact 
Effective Implementing Legislation, AI Index: lOR 401019/2004, I Sept. 2004, [hereinafter AI: 
Failure of States to Enact Effective Implementing Legislation] available at: 
<http://web.arnnesty.orgllibrarylIndexIENGIOR400192004?open&of=ENG-385> (observing that 
not many States have enacted national legislation implementing the ICC Statute, and that the few 
States that have done so, enacted flawed and inconsistent legislation.). The report notes that the 
most common problems that are emerging in draft legislation now being prepared or considered are: 
· weak definitions of crimes; 
· unsatisfactory principles of criminal responsibility and defenses; 
· failure to provide for universal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by international 
law; 
· political control over the initiation of prosecutions; 
· failure to provide for the speediest and most efficient procedures for reparations to vic-
tims; 
· inclusion of provisions that prevent or could potentially prevent cooperation with the 
Court; 
· failure to provide for persons sentenced by the Court to serve sentences in national pris-
ons;and 
· failure to establish training programs for national authorities on effective implementa-
tion of the Rome Statute. 
/d. at 2. 
Also of concern is the failure of some of the implementing legislation to provide adequate proce-
dural guarantees, including the right to fair trial. Further, some national implementing legislation 
allows the imposition of the death penalty. This is contrary to Article 77 of the ICC Statute which 
provides that the maximum penalty the Court may impose is life imprisonment. It is therefore inap-
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Further, it should be borne in mind that the Court's jurisdiction is de-
signed to target a limited number of "persons for the most serious crimes 
of international concern."85 In addition, the high threshold requirements 
for the crimes under the ICC Statute, limit the Court's jurisdiction to 
crimes against humanity, committed as part of a "widespread or system-
atic attack,"86 or war crimes when such crimes have been committed as 
part of a plan or policy or have taken place on a particularly large scale.87 
The Prosecutor is also required under the ICC Statute to satisfy the Court 
that the case is of "sufficient gravity to justify further action by the 
Court."88 
In view of the above, the Court will not occupy the field. It will target 
only a small portion of perpetrators who are highly responsible for 
atrocities and will decline to exercise its inherent jurisdiction in cases in 
which deferral to national jurisdiction would be more appropriate. Thus, 
the States would still exercise concurrent jurisdiction by prosecuting 
others responsible at a lower degree. 
B. SUSPENSION OF THE COURT'S JURISDICTION BY THE UN SECURITY 
COUNCIL 
One concern throughout the negotiations for the ICC Statute, expressed 
mostly by the permanent members of the Security Council, was the pos-
sibility of conflict between the jurisdiction of the Court and the functions 
of the Council. It was argued that there may be situations in which the 
investigation or prosecution of a particular case by the Court could inter-
fere with the resolution of an ongoing conflict by the Security Council. 
Also, the permanent members of the Security Council wanted to preserve 
a central role for the Council in the new Court.89 To this extent, some 
lobbied for a provision that would automatically exclude the Court's 
jurisdiction over any situation under consideration by the Council. Most 
States regarded this proposal as too sweeping and feared it would un-
dermine the Court, for situations could remain pending before the Coun-
cil indefinitely without its taking any final or serious action. In the end, a 
compromise provision was reached, which provided that the Security 
Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, could adopt a reso-
lution requesting deferral of an investigation or prosecution for a period 
propriate that national courts should impose a more severe penalty for a crime under international 
law than the one chosen by the international community itself. [d. at 25, 27. 
85. ICC Statute, supra note I, preamble 9, arts. 1,5. 
86. [d. art. 7. 
87. ICC Statute, supra note I, art. 8. 
88. [d. art. 17(I)(d). 
89. John Seguin, supra note 52, at 95-96. 
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of twelve months and that such a request could be renewed at twelve-
month intervals.90 
Article 16 is an unnecessary limitation on the jurisdiction of the Court 
because it allows the Security Council, by resolution, to stop a prosecu-
tion initiated by a State or the ICC Prosecutor from going forward for an 
initial period of twelve months if, in the opinion of the Security Council, 
the prosecution will interfere with the Council's efforts to maintain inter-
national peace and security under Article vn of the UN Charter. The 
Security Council can renew its request indefinitely, in twelve month 
segments, under the same conditions.91 In other words, the UN Security 
Council may perpetually intervene to suspend a case before the ICC at 
every twelve month interval on identical grounds because Article 16 does 
not limit the number of times the UN Security Council may request the 
suspension of a case for security reasons.92 This provision was a result of 
a compromise suggestion by Singapore to appease the U.S.93 
One of the main reasons for the creation of the ICC was to end the cul-
ture of impunity by holding individuals criminally responsible for egre-
gious violations of crimes prohibited by international law.94 Therefore, 
the rationale behind the establishment of the ICC is that it would help 
end or at least reduce the commission of genocide, war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and other related atrocities that shock the conscience 
of humankind. Thus, it is an irony of a sort to suggest that the Court's 
exercise of jurisdiction to investigate or prosecute individuals accused of 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes may impede the Secu-
rity Council's efforts to maintain international peace and security under 
Article vn of the UN Charter. 
It is plausible to suggest that only States that are permanent members of 
the Security Council stand in a better position to use this provision to 
perpetually forestall the prosecution of a case concerning their nationals. 
Members of the Security Council may choose to use this provision to 
stop investigations into situations concerning nationals of member States 
and would likely do so at the urging of one of its powerful permanent 
members. Indeed, in 2002, the U.S. threatened to withdraw its nationals 
90. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 16. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. John Washburn, The International Criminal Coun Arrivers - The U.S. Position: Status and 
Prospects, 25 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 873, 878 (2002) (citing Lionel Yee, The International Criminal 
Coun and the Security Council, in THE lNrERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, THE MAKING OF THE 
ROME STATUTE - IsSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, REsULTS 143 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999) [hereinafter THE 
MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE]. 
94. ICC Statute, supra note 1, preamble. 
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from UN peacekeeping missions unless the Security Council passed a 
resolution grating immunity to U.S. nationals from ICC prosecution. 
The Security Council yielded to U.S. pressure and passed Resolution 
1422 in July 2002 which deferred the Court's jurisdiction for one year 
over personnel of non-State parties participating in peacekeeping mis-
sions or operations authorized by the UN.95 Resolution 1422 was re-
newed for another year by Resolution 1487 in June 2003.96 
While Resolution 1422 was adopted unanimously in 2002, France, Ger-
many and Syria abstained from voting for Resolution 1487 in 2003. In 
2004, the U.S. withdrew their request to renew Resolution 1487 because 
it failed to receive the necessary votes to again defer the Court's jurisdic-
tion.97 However, the Security Council has created a precedent that may 
be latched onto by other States in the future to demand similar exemp-
tions. To forestall this unnecessary hindrance to the Court's jurisdiction, 
it is suggested that Article 16 should be deleted from the Statute.98 
Further, even where the Security Council refers a case to the Court, the 
Council may seek to micro-manage the investigation or prosecution of 
the case. For instance, Security Council Resolution 1593 which referred 
the situation in Darfur to the Court requires the Chief Prosecutor of ICC 
to periodically apprise the Security Council of actions taken.99 
Accordingly, the Prosecutor has addressed the Security Council on the 
95. See Security Council Resolution 1422, S.c. Res. 1422, U.N. SCOR, 4572nd mtg., U.N. 
Doc. SlRESIl422 (2002), July 12,2002, available at 
<http://www.un.orgIDocs/Scresl2002/sc2002.htm>. 
96. Security Council Resolution 1487, S.C. Res. 1487, U.N. SCOR, 4772nd mtg., U.N. Doc. 
SlRESIl487 (2003), June 12,2003, available at: 
<http://www.un.orgIDocs/sc/unsc_resolutions03.html>. 
97. See Coalition for the ICC, Chronology of the Adoption and Withdrawal of Security Coun-
cil Resolutions 1422/1487, 
<http://www.iccnow.orgldocuments/declarationsresolutionsIUN1422_2004.html>. The failure to 
secure the vote to renew Resolution 1487 was related to concerns over allegations of abuse by U.S. 
soldiers at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Id. See also, Amnesty International, U.S. Threats to the 
International Criminal Court, available at: <http://web.amnesty.orglpages/icc-US_threats-eng> 
(visited Feb. 10, 2006). 
98. See Amnesty International, International Criminal Court: The Unlawful Attempt by the 
Security Council to Give US Citizens Permanent Impunity From International Justice, AI Index, 
lOR 40/006/2003 (a legal analysis of Security Council Resolutions 1422 & 1487 by Amnesty Inter-
national concluding that the resolution is contrary to the Rome Statute, and also to the United Na-
tions Charter). A summary of the legal analysis is available at: 
<http://web.amnesty.orgllibrary/indexlengIOR400082003?Open&of=eng-393> (visited Feb. 10, 
2(06). 
99. Security Council Resolution 1593, U.N. SCOR, 60th Sess., 5158th mtg., U.N. Doc. 
SIRESIl593, 8 (March 31, 2(05) (the Prosecutor is required to address the Council within three 
months of the date of adoption of this resolution and every six months thereafter on actions taken 
pursuant to this resolution). 
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Darfur situation twice. IOO It is not impossible that the Security Council 
may decide at a later stage to invoke Article 16 to stop the Court from 
going forward with the case. 
The idea that the Security Council should play an oversight role on the 
operations of the Court should be resisted.101 The Court is envisioned as 
an independent entity and should remain as such. The Security Council 
should not be allowed to politicize the judicial functions of the Court. 
While the Security Council's cooperation with the Court will enhance its 
effectiveness, any attempt to subject it to the whims and caprice of the 
Security Council will greatly undermine the Court's independence and 
credibility. States, particularly developing and "third" world countries, 
may view the Court as another vestige of western domination. 
C. F AlLURE TO PROVIDE FOR UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 
The jurisdictional reach of the ICC is more limited than the general in-
ternational jurisdiction currently enjoyed by States or groups of States 
over jus cogens violations. lo2 As noted above, State delegates at the 
Rome Conference agreed on a compromised Article 12 which sets out 
the preconditions for the Court's jurisdiction when a situation is not re-
ferred to the Court by the Security Council. Throughout the Conference, 
the U.S. sought to limit the Court's jurisdiction by arguing that the Court 
should exercise jurisdiction only against nationals of States Parties or 
territorial States on claims of official acts. The United States wanted a 
situation in which no U.S. national would ever be brought before the ICC 
without U.S. consent.103 
100. Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Mr. Luis Moreno Ocampo, to 
the Security Council Pursuant to UNSR 1593 (2005), June 29, 2005, available at <http://www.icc-
cpi.intlpressrelease_details&id=108&I=en.htmi> and Second Report of the Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court, Mr. Luis Moreno Ocampo, to the Security Council Pursuant to UNSR 
1593 (2005), Dec. 13,2005, available at 
<http://www.icc-cpi.intlcases/current_situationslDarfur_Sudan.html>. 
101. Bruce D. Landrum, The Globalization of Justice: The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, 2002-Sep ARMy LAW I, II (2002) (noting that one of the main concerns of the 
United States is the limited role played by the United Nations Security Council in the operation of 
the ICC). 
102. See also Michael P. Scharf, The ICC's Jurisdiction Over the Nationals of Non-Party 
States: A Critique of the U.S. Position, 64 LAw & CONfEMP. PROBS. 67, 116 (2001) (observing that 
"the core crimes within the ICC's jurisdiction - genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes -
are crimes of universal jurisdiction."). 
103. Ruth Wedgwood, Harold K. Jacobson & Monroe Leigh, The United States and the Statute 
of Rome, 95 A.J.I.L. 124, 126 (2001). 
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Also, the U.S. demanded a guarantee that no U.S. servicemen or women 
would be investigated or prosecuted by the ICC without U.S. consent. 104 
It has been suggested that the justification for the U.S. position was that 
"more than any other country the United States is expected to intervene 
to halt humanitarian catastrophes around the world."105 It was therefore 
argued that this position renders U.S. personnel "uniquely vulnerable to 
the potential jurisdiction of an international criminal court."I06 Accord-
ing to Ambassador David Scheffer: 
The illogical consequence imposed by Article 12, particularly for 
non-parties to the treaty, will be to limit severely those lawful, 
but highly controversial and inherently risky, interventions that 
the advocates of human rights and world peace so desperately 
seek from the United States and other military powers. There 
will be significant new legal and political risks in such interven-
tions ... 107 
Apart from the apparent inequality of this request, its obvious implica-
tion is that a guarantee for America would mean a de jure and de facto 
exemption of all other States, effectively rendering the purpose of the 
Court moribund. 108 
Although the U.S. pOSItion was not acceptable to most States at the 
Rome Conference, a proposal by Korea that the Court should exercise 
jurisdiction where the victim's State or the custodial State has ratified the 
ICC Statute was also rejected in order to accommodate U.S. concerns 
regarding supposed over-reach of the Court's jurisdiction.109 Thus, ab-
sent submission of a case to the ICC by the UN Security Council, the 
Court can only exercise jurisdiction where the case occurs in the territory 
of a State Party, or where the crime is committed by a national of a State 
104. Id. at 126. See also, Thomas W. Lippman, America Avoids the Stand: Why the U.S. Ob· 
jects to a World Criminal Court, WASH. POST, July 26, 1998, at COl (noting that the American 
Government insisted that the Rome Statute must contain an ironclad guarantee that no American 
would ever come before the Court). 
105. Michael P. Scharf, Rome Diplomatic Conference for an International Criminal Court, 
AS.I.L. Insights (June 1998), available at <http://asil.org/insightslinsigh20.htm> (accessed March 
15,2002). 
106. Id. 
107. David Scheffer, The United States and the International Criminal Court, 93 AJ.lL. 12, 19 
(1999). 
108. Remigius Chibueze, United States Objection to the International Criminal Court: A Para· 
dox of "Operation Enduring Freedom", IX ANN. SURV.INT'L & COMPo L. 19,44·45 (2003). 
109. Human Rights Watch, Text Analysis International Criminal Court Treaty, July 17, 1998 
available at <http://www.hrw.org/press98/july/icc-anly.htm> (last modified April 4, 2002) [hereinaf· 
ter ICC Treaty Text Analysis]. 
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Party.11O It should be noted that in most cases, the State of nationality 
and the territorial State are likely to be the same, as was the case with Pol 
Pot of Cambodia, Idi Amin of Uganda, Pinochet of Chile, and as exem-
plified by the ftrst three State referrals to the Court. 
The inclusion of the custodial State would have made it possible to ap-
prehend an accused while traveling outside his or her State, or in the al-
ternative, make it difftcult for the accused to travel outside his or her 
State, thereby denying a safe haven anywhere. But, given the way Article 
12 was drafted, a country in whose territory an accused is residing will 
have no legal basis under the ICC Statute to surrender the accused to the 
Court. This is because Article 12 only requires a State Party to submit to 
the Court's jurisdiction if the crime was committed on its territory, or the 
person accused of the crime is a national. III In other words, in a situation 
in which a national of State A commits a crime in State A and then enters 
State B ostensibly to evade justice, State B is not obliged to surrender 
him or her to the Court because the crime was not committed in State B's 
territory and the accused is not a national of State B. The situation be-
comes compounded if State B is not a State Party to the ICC Statute. 
Article 12 also makes it impossible for the victim's State to submit a case 
to the ICC if its nationals were victims of international crimes in the ter-
ritory of another State or by nationals of a non-State Party. It has been 
suggested that if a victim's State is allowed to submit a case to the Court, 
the Spanish Government would have been in a position to petition the 
ICC (if it were then in existence) for the "disappearance" of some Span-
iards in Argentina in the 1970s and 80s.112 This possibility is not avail-
able even under the new ICC Statute. 
The idea that extending the ICC jurisdiction to include custodial andlor 
victim's States or that the current jurisdiction of the Court is overreach-
ing and therefore violates fundamental principles of international law 
because it binds non-State Parties ll3 is untenable. The U.S. takes the posi-
tion that under customary international law, a treaty-based international 
court cannot exercise jurisdiction over the nationals of a non-Party State 
when acting under the direction of such a non-Party State. 1I4 
Also, another commentator has suggested that, by conferring upon the 
ICC jurisdiction over non-Party nationals, the ICC Statute would abro-
110. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 12. 
111. [d. art. 12(2)(a-b). 
112. ICC Treaty Text Analysis, supra note 109. 
113. David Scheffer, supra note 107, at 18. 
114. [d. 
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gate the pre-existing rights of non-parties which, in turn, would violate 
the law of treaties. IIS Additionally, this commentator suggested that a 
State has a right to be free from the exercise of exorbitant jurisdiction 
over its nationals which cannot be abrogated by a treaty to which it is not 
a Party.116 Cited in support were the ll...C Official Commentaries on the 
Vienna Convention to the effect that "international tribunals have been 
firm in laying down that in principle treaties, whether bilateral or multi-
lateral, neither imposes obligations on States which are not parties nor 
modify in any way their legal rights without their consent."117 Further-
more, it was argued that because of the gravity of the outcome, member 
States cannot delegate to the ICC their territorial or universal jurisdic-
tion. lls 
Those who make the argument that the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction 
over individuals if his or her State has not ratified the ICC Statute con-
fuse and/or equate the position of a non-Party State with that of its na-
tionals. As would be expected, this argument has been rejected by inter-
national law commentators on the simple basis that while a non-Party 
State is not itself obligated under a treaty to which it has not consented, 
the same cannot be said of its nationals if they commit an offense in the 
territory of a State that is a Party.119 Responding to criticism of the 
Court's jurisdiction over nationals of non-Party States for crimes com-
mitted within the territory of State Parties to the ICC Statute, Judge Phil-
ippe Kirsch, current President of the Court, noted as follows: 
This does not bind non-parties to the [s]tatute. It simply con-
firms the recognized principle that individuals are subject to the 
substantive and procedural criminal laws applicable in the terri-
tories to which they travel, including laws arising from treaty ob-
ligations. 120 
The above expression is in accordance with Article 34 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties which provides that "a treaty does not 
115. Madeline Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States, 64 L. 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 13,26 (2001). 
116. Id. at 27. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 26. 
119. Ruth Wedgwood, et aI., supra note 103, at 127. 
120. Philippe Kirsch, The Rome Conference on the International Criminal Court: A Comment, 
1998 A.S.I.L. Newsletter I (1998). Judge Kirsch was the Chairman of the Rome Diplomatic Con-
ference. 
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create either obligations or rights for a third state without its consent."121 
Also, Article 35 states that a treaty cannot establish an obligation on a 
non-Party State unless it "expressly accepts that obligation in writing."122 
The ICC Statute does not violate the above provisions of the Vienna 
Convention as no provision of the ICC Statute expressly created obliga-
tions for non-Party States. Also, allowing the ICC to exercise jurisdic-
tion based on the consent of a custodial or victim's State will not violate 
the Vienna Convention either. 123 
Suffice it to note that there are plethora of international conventions ac-
ceded to by the U.S. and many other States that are globally binding on 
nationals of Party and non-Party States because they reflect the common 
interest of humanity. 124 No doubt, the crimes prohibited by the ICC Stat-
ute reflect the common interest of humanity. At present, any individual 
State may try perpetrators of these crimes under universal or territorial 
jurisdiction principles without consent from the State of his or her na-
tionality.125 Thus, if individual States can exercise universal jurisdiction 
over the same crimes contained in the ICC Statute,126 there has not been 
any convincing legal argument to deny a group of States from joining 
121. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 34, V.N. Doc. 
AlCONF.39/27 (1969), entered into force on Jan. 27, 1980 reprinted in 1155 V.N.T.S. 331 (1969); 
25 ll..M 543 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention on the Law of Treatiesl. 
122. Id. art. 35. . 
123. Id. art. 38 ("Nothing ... precludes a rule set forth in a treaty from becoming binding upon 
a third State as a customary rule of international law, recognized as such"). 
124. See Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 
14,1963,220 V.N.T.S. 1969,20 V.S.T. 2941; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure 
of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 106 V.N.T.S. 1973,22 U.S.T. 1641 (Hague Convention); Convention for 
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23,1971,178 V.N.T.S. 
1975; 24 U.S.T. 565 (Montreal Convention); The International Convention Against the Taking of 
Hostages, Dec. 17,1979,206 U.N.T.S. 1983; 1979 U.S.T. 186; The Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, 
adopted Dec. 14, 1973, 168 V.N.T.S. 1977,28 V.S.T. 1975 (Protected Persons Convention); The 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
adopted Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 1988 V.S.T. LEXIS 202 (Torture Convention); The 
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, opened for 
signature Nov. 30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243 (Apartheid Convention); The Convention on the Physi-
cal Protection of Nuclear Material, Oct. 26, 1979, 1979 U.S.T. LEXIS 187. These treaties provide 
for and obligate States, both states of nationality and territorial states, to exercise jurisdiction or 
extradite. Furthermore, the Montreal Convention, the International Convention Against the Taking 
of Hostages, the Protected Persons Convention, the Torture Convention and the Apartheid Conven-
tion allow for the victim's state to either exercise jurisdiction or extradite. The U.S. is a member of 
all except the Apartheid Convention. 
125. Paul Amell, International Criminal Law and Universal Jurisdiction, II INT'L LEGAL 
PERSP. 53, 60-63 (1999). See also, Attorney-General of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5, 26 
(Israel S.Ct. 1962); Demjanjuk V. Petrovsky, 776 F. 2d 571, 582-583 (6th Cir. 1985). 
126. Under the principle of universal jurisdiction, a State is permitted to prosecute non-nationals 
for certain crimes committed outside that State's territory. See, M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES 
AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 520 (1992); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES 
OF PuBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 300-04 (4th ed. 1990); Kenneth Randall, Universal Jurisdiction 
Under International Law, 66 TEx. L. REv. 785 (1988). 
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together to set up a court that does the same thing. Indeed, the Nurem-
berg tribunal set the precedent for this situation when it stated: "[the Al-
lied Powers] have done together what anyone of them might have done 
singly; for it is not to be doubted that any nation has the right thus to set 
up special courts to administer law."127 
In view of the above, it cannot be argued that the Court's exercise of 
treaty-based jurisdiction over the nationals of non-Party State for interna-
tional crimes contravenes this rule of international law .128 Therefore, the 
argument that the ICC Statute is "overreaching" because it purportedly 
obligates non-Party States through the exercise of jurisdiction over their 
nationals is a gross distortion of customary international law. 129 Confer-
ring the ICC with universal jurisdiction helps to realize one of the objec-
tives behind the establishment of the Court, which is, to ensure there is 
no safe sanctuary for individuals wanted for committing egregious 
crimes. 
Until the Court is invested with universal jurisdiction, we will continue 
to see cases similar to the case of Charles Taylor, former president of 
Liberia, who found safe haven in Nigeria despite an international arrest 
warrant for his surrender to a tribunal in Sierra Lone. Nigeria is under 
pressure to surrender Mr. Taylor to the Sierra Leonean tribunal but has 
refused based upon the terms of their asylum agreement with Mr. Tay-
lor. 130 It would be a different situation if Mr. Taylor was wanted by the 
ICC after he had successfully fled to or was granted amnesty by a non-
127. See, Nuremberg Charter, supra note 47, at 216-17. 
128. Michael P. Scharf, Application of Treaty-Based Universal Jurisdiction to Nationals of 
Non-Party States, 35 NEW ENG. L.R. 363, 376 (2001). 
129. See Human Rights Watch, The ICC Jurisdictional Regime; Addressing U.S. Arguments, 
available at <hup:/Iwww.hrw.org/hrw/campaigns/icc/docs/icc-regime.htm> (last modified April 4, 
2002). 
130. Mr. Obasanjo, Nigerian's President takes the position that it granted asylum to Mr. Taylor 
pursuant to the so called Accra Comprehensive Peace Accord to prevent a bloodbath in Uberia on 
the understanding that he would not be required to try or surrender Mr. Taylor to an International 
Tribunal except at the request of the Government of Uberia or if Mr. Taylor violates his undertaking 
not to interfere in Uberian politics. See James Seitua, Why Obasanjo Has Not Turned Taylor Over?, 
THE PERSPECTIVE, Atlanta, Georgia, May 31, 2005, available at: 
<http://www.theperspective.org/Articles/0531200502.html> (visited Feb. 28, 2006); BBC NEWS, 
Taylor meets Obasanjo in Nigeria, Feb. 27, 2006, available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uklgo/pr/fr/-
l2lhilafrical4754982.stm> (visited Feb. 28, 2006); BBC NEWS, Taylor off Agenda at Abuja Talks, 
March 4, 2006, available at: 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2Ihi/africal4775012.stm> (reporting that Mr. Taylor's departure 
into exile was part of a deal backed by African and Western powers and quoting BBC's Elizabeth 
Blunt in Abuja as saying that the terms of the deal are believed to have included a comfortable home 
in Nigeria and a pledge that he would not be handed over for prosecution. BBC News also quoted 
Remi Oyo, Mr. Obasanjo's spokeswoman that "the prerogative of the return of former President 
Taylor remains that of the Uberian people and Government."); BBC NEWS, Taylor Meets Obasanjo 
in Nigeria, Feb. 27, 2006, available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/golpr/fr/-/2/hi/africal4754982.stm> 
(visited Feb. 28, 2006). 
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Party State. The non-Party State would have no obligation whatsoever to 
surrender Mr. Taylor to the Court and in that circumstance Mr. Taylor 
would find a safe haven in that State. Also, even if Mr. Taylor finds 
himself in the territory of a State Party to the ICC Statute, that State can-
not confer jurisdiction on the Court if Mr. Taylor did not commit the 
crime in the territory of that State and he is not a national of the State 
Party. In the above scenario, the 'traveling tyrant' is allowed to exploit 
the limitation in the ICC jurisdiction to evade justice. l3l 
D. WAR CRIMES OPT-OUT PROVISION 
With pressure from the U.S., the Rome Conference agreed on Article 124 
which allows a State Party to opt out of the Court's jurisdiction for war 
crimes committed on its territory or by its nationals in internal armed 
conflict for seven years after becoming a Party to the ICC Statute.132 The 
U.S. representatives to the Rome Conference had sought a ten year "opt 
out" from the Court's jurisdiction over war crimes, but the Conference 
agreed only to a seven year opt-out period.133 Article 124 provides a 
compromise capable of "undermining the status of war crimes as truly 
universal crimes [that might] result in a court with a fragmented jurisdic-
tion."l34 Such a declaration effectively grants immunity from prosecution 
for those who commit war crimes in the future while their actions con-
tinue to cause immense suffering to humankind for years to come. 
Therefore, the opt-out provision has been criticized as creating a legally 
and morally unjustifiable loophole to the evasion of justice.135 
Currently, only Columbia and France have availed themselves of the 
provisions of Article 124.136 Fortunately, the Burundian Government's 
131. Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Cadern, supra note 65, at 414, n.194 (attributing the 
phrase "traveling tyrant" to Jelena Pejic, representative of the Lawyer's Committee at the Rome 
Conference). 
132. ICC Statute, supra note I, art. 124. Article 124 provides that a state Party to the ICC may 
elect to exempt its nationals from the jurisdiction of the Court for a non-renewable period of seven 
years from the date of ratification of the statute for war crimes. 
133. See David Scheffer, U.N. InternatioTUll CrimiTUll Court, Statement Before the Committee 
on Foreign Relations of the U.S. SeTUlte (July 23,1998) available at 1998 WL 12762512. 
134. Jonathan Stanley, Focus: InternatioTUll CrimiTUll Court: A Court that Knows No Bounda-
ries?: The IntematioTUll CrimiTUll Court Treaty is a Big Achievement but Can it Deliver what it 
Promises?, THE LAWYER, Aug. II, 1998, available at 1998 WL 9167987. 
135. Philippe Kirsch, Q.c., The International CrimiTUll court: Current Issues and Perspectives, 
64 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 10 (2001). 
136. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Declarations and Reservations, 
available at 
<http://untreaty.un.orglENGLISHlbiblelenglishinternetbiblelpartYchapterXVIWtreaty II.asp#N7> 
[hereinafter ICC Statute: Declarations and Reservationsj. 
The Columbian Article 124 Declaration states as follows: 
5. Availing itself of the option provided in Article 124 of the Statute and subject to the 
conditions established therein, the Government of Colombia declares that it does not ac-
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desire to make an Article 124 declaration was rejected by their Senate. 137 
The "opt out" clause is an unwarranted restriction on the Court's juris-
diction which will severely hamper its effectiveness for years, if not dec-
ades.138 While it is reassuring that only two States have made the Article 
124 declaration, it is necessary however that States demonstrate their 
willingness to hold war criminals accountable by ensuring that Article 
124 is deleted from the ICC Statute when it comes up for review in 
2009.139 
E. RELIANCE ON STATES' COOPERATION 
Generally, in order for the Court to effectively exercise its jurisdiction, 
the Court must rely on the ability and willingness of State Parties to dis-
charge their obligations under the ICC Statute. l40 In the preamble to the 
ICC Statute, States Parties affirm that '''the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole must not go 
unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by 
taking measures at the national level and by international cooperation."141 
With the efforts of like-minded States, 142 delegates at the Rome 
Conference agreed on the need for effective and speedy cooperation with 
the Court. As a result, Part 9 of the ICC Statute contains the obligations 
cept the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the category of crimes referred to in Ar-
ticle 8 when a crime is alleged to have been committed by Colombian nationals or on Co-
lombian territory. 
The French Government Article 124 Declaration states: 
III. Declaration under Article 124 
Pursuant to Article 124 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, the 
French Republic declares that it does not accept the jurisdiction of the Court 
with respect to the category of crimes referred to in Article 8 when a crime is 
alleged to have been committed by its nationals or on its territory. 
137. See Amnesty International, Burundi - Urge the President to Ratify the Rome Statute of the 
ICC, available at <http://web.arnnesty.org/pageslicc-290104-action-eng> (Appeal Letter from Am-
nesty International urging the Burundian Government to ratify the Rome Statute without such a 
'license to kill' declaration. The ICC Statute was ratified by Burundi on Sept. 21, 2004, without 
such declaration. See ICC Statute: Declarations and Reservations, supra note 136. 
138. James Rodgers, War Crimes Coun Under Fire, 1998 ABA JOUR. 68 (Sept. 1998) (quoting 
Jelena Pejic, Senior Program Coordinator, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, New York). 
139. Article 124 is subject to review at the Review Conference which is scheduled to take place 
seven years after the entry into force of the ICC Statute. Since the ICC Statute came into force in 
2002, the Review Conference will be held in 2009. See ICC Statute, supra note I, arts. 123, 124. 
140. Hans-Peter Kau, Developments at the International Criminal Coun: Construction Site For 
More Justice: The International Criminal Coun After Two Years, 99 A.J.l.L. 370, 383 (2005)(noting 
that "the hopes and expectations at the International Criminal Court are that the states parties will 
support it as responsible joint owners by engaging in unreserved and systematic cooperation in 
matters of criminal law"). 
141. ICC Statute, supra note 1, preamble, para. 4. 
142. See Philippe Kirsch & John T. Holmes, The Rome Conference on an International Crimi-
nal Coun: The Negotiating Process, 93 A.J.lL. 2,4 (1999). 
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of international cooperation and judicial assistance of States Parties to 
the Court. 143 
When a State ratifies the ICC Statute, it assumes the obligation to 
"cooperate fully with the Court in the investigation and prosecution of 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court."I44 Further, the ICC Statute 
requires that States Parties ensure that there are procedures under their 
national law for all fonns of cooperation specified in the Statute. 145 
A significant aspect of this obligation is arresting and surrendering 
persons accused of crimes to the Court. l46 This is necessary as the Court 
cannot try an accused person in absentia. 147 Thus, "a decision by the 
Prosecutor to bring charges against an accused will prompt the critical, 
indeed crucial question of arrests and transfer to The Hague."148 In other 
words, the Court would be unable to exercise its jurisdiction if States 
refused, delayed or otherwise failed to carry out their obligation to arrest 
and/or surrender the accused to the Court. There is no doubt that "the 
credibility of the Court would suffer if an arrest warrant issued by the 
judges of the Pre-Trial Chamber at the request of the prosecutor pursuant 
to Article 58 remained ineffective over a long period because the States 
Parties were slow, or failed, to execute it."149 
143. For a discussion of the cooperation regime in the Rome Statute, see Bruce Broomhall, The 
International Criminal Coun: Overview, and Cooperation with States, in 1999 ICC RATIFICATION 
AND NATIONAL IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 45 (Nouvelles Etudes Penales, 1999); Annalisa 
Ciampi, Other Forms of Cooperation, in 2 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT: A COMMENTARY 1705 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, & John R. W. D. Jones eds., 2002) 
[hereinafter THE ROME STATUTE: A COMMENTARY]; Frederik Harhoff & Phakiso Mochochoko, 
International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: 
ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 637 (Roy S. Lee ed., 2001); 
Hans-Peter Kaul & Claus Kress, Jurisdiction and Cooperation in the Statute of the International 
Criminal Coun: Principles and Compromises, 1999 Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 143 (1999); 
Claus Kress, et aI., International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance: Preliminary Remarks, in 
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 46, at 1045; Phakiso Mochochoko, International 
Cooperation and Judicial Assistance, in THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 93, at 
305; Valerie Oosterveld, Mike Perry, & John McManus, The Cooperation of States with the Interna-
tional Criminal Coun, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 767 (2002); Bert Swart & Goran Sluiter, The Inter-
national Criminal Coun and International Criminal Co-operation, in REFLECTIONS ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 91 (Herman von Hebel et al. eds., 1999). 
144. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 86. 
145. Id. art. 88. 
146. Id. art. 89. 
147. Id. art. 63. Article 63 makes it very clear that "the accused shall be present during the 
trial" and that there can thus be no trials in absentia. 
148. Hans-Peter Kaul, supra note 23, at 375 (citing the Report of the Prosecutor of the ICC, Mr. 
Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Second Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (Sept. 8, 2003). 
149. Hans-Peter Kaul, supra note 23, at 383. 
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Apart from other express and implicit obligations contained in the ICC 
Statute, Article 93 of the Statute details certain specific cooperation 
obligations on States parties to assist the Court with respect to 
investigations and prosecutions.15o These obligations are by no means 
exhaustive but should at least represent a minimal requirement on States 
Parties to the ICC Statute. However, a study by Amnesty International in 
2004 reveals that States Parties' response to their obligations under the 
Statute has been disappointing. 151 The study notes that among the few 
States that have adopted national legislation implementing their 
obligations under the ICC Statute, almost all the States have taken a 
minimalist approach to cooperation with the Court and few have 
included provisions that go beyond the express requirements of the ICC 
Statute. 152 This author shares the concern of Amnesty International that 
"if every state Party were to take a minimalist approach to implementing 
its cooperation obligations, the effectiveness of the Court would be 
greatly reduced, leading in some cases to impunity."153 
150. Article 93 provides: 
1. States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Part and under proce-
dures of national law, comply with requests by the Court to provide the following assis-
tance in relation to investigations or prosecutions: 
(a) The identification and whereabouts of persons or the location of items; 
(b) The taking of evidence, including testimony under oath, and the produc-
tion of evidence, including expert opinions and reports necessary to the Court; 
(c) The questioning of any person being investigated or prosecuted; 
(d) The service of documents, including judicial documents; 
(e) Facilitating the voluntary appearance of persons as witnesses or experts 
before the Court; 
(f) The temporary transfer of persons as provided in paragraph 7; 
(g) The examination of places or sites, including the exhumation and exami-
nation of grave sites; 
(h) The execution of searches and seizures; 
(i) The provision of records and documents, including official records and 
documents; 
(j) The protection of victims and witnesses and the preservation of evidence; 
(k) The identification, tracing and freezing or seizure of proceeds, property 
and assets and instrumentalities of crimes for the purpose of eventual forfei-
ture, without prejudice to the rights of bona fide third parties; and 
(I) Any other type of assistance which is not prohibited by the law of the re-
quested State, with a view to facilitating the investigation and prosecution of 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. 
ICC Statute, supra note I, art. 93(1)(a-I). 
151. See AI: Failure of States to Enact Effective Implementing Legislation, supra note 84. 
152. Id. at 32. 
153. Id. Regarding the situation in Darfur, Sudan, see, SUDAN TRmUNE, ICC Delegation to 
Visit Sudan's Darfur, Feb. 27, 2006, available at: 
<http://www.sudantribune.comlArticle.php3?id_Article=14271> (visited Feb. 28, 2006) (reporting 
that the ICC Prosecutor, Mr. Moreno Ocampo has told the Security Council that the International 
Criminal Court and the African Union, which has troops in Darfur, had drawn up a Cooperation 
Agreement in May 2005, which still was not signed). 
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F. ARTICLE 98 IMMUNITY AGREEMENTS 
While the ICC Statute requires States Parties to ensure that there are 
procedures under their national law for all forms of cooperation specified 
in the Statute,154 some States Parties have taken steps that make their 
compliance with Article 88 impossible, such as entering into an "immu-
nity" agreement with the U.S. The bilateral immunity agreement is an 
undertaking by the States concerned that U.S. persons will not be surren-
dered to the Court without U.S. consent. 155 The Bush administration has 
threatened ICC States Parties with withdrawal of military aid, including 
education, training, and financing the purchases of equipment and weap-
onry, if they fail to protect Americans serving in their countries from 
ICC's reach.156 By May of 2005, about 100 States have signed this im-
munity agreement which is referred to colloquially as the "Article 98 
Agreement. "157 
It has been suggested that "these bilateral agreements ... are provided for 
under Article 98 of the Rome Statute."15S This argument is inapposite.159 
Article 98, which emerged at the Rome Diplomatic Conference, was 
drafted to address the question of the relationship between the 
154. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 88. 
155. Christopher Marquis, U.S. Seeking Pacts in a Bid to Shield its Peacekeepers, N.Y. TIMEs, 
Aug. 6, 2002. 
156. Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Ties Military Aid to Peacekeepers' Immunity, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 
2002, at Ai. 
157. See U.S. Department of State Press Statement, U.S. Signs JOOth Article 98 Agreement, 
May 3, 2005, 2005/463, available at: <http://www.state.gov/r/palprs/ps12005/45573.htm> (the press 
statement notes that on May 2, 2005, Angola became the lOOth country to conclude such an agree-
ment with the United States). As of May 18,2005, Amnesty International reports that the States that 
have ratified an immunity agreement with the USA include Afghanistan, Albania, Azerbaijan, Bhu-
tan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Djibouti, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, 
Guyana, Honduras, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Macedonia, the Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Micro-
nesia, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Palau, Panama, Romania, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Tajiki-
stan, Timor-l..este, and Uzbekistan have ratified such agreements. See Amnesty International, avail-
able at: <http://web.arnnesty.orglpages/int.Jus_icc_imp_agrees> (last updated May 18,2(05). 
158. Id. See also, Ruth Wedgwood, The International Criminal Court: An American View, 10 
EUR. J.INT'L L. 93 (1999). 
159. For a detailed analysis on this, see generally, Amnesty International, International Crimi-
nal Court: U.S. Efforts to Obtain Immunity For Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War 
Crimes, AI Index: lOR 40102512002, Sept. 2, 2002, [hereinafter U.S. Efforts to Obtain Immunity 
Agreement) available at <http://web.arnnesty.orgllibrary/indexlengIOR4oo252002?Open&of=eng-
385> (visited Feb. 10,2(06); Amnesty International, International Criminal Court: The Needfor the 
European Union to Take More Effective Steps to Prevent Members From Signing US Immunity 
Agreements, AI Index: lOR 401030/2002, Oct. 1,2002, available at: 
<http://web.arnnesty.orgllibrary/indexlengior400302002?open&of=eng-385> (visited February 10, 
2006); Human Rights Watch, United States Efforts to Undermine the International Criminal Court: 
Article 98 (2) Agreements, July 9, 2002, available at 
<www.hrw.orglcarnpaignslicdicc_Article98.pdf> (visited Feb. 10,2006) (expressing the view "that 
existing U.S. SOFAs are not the type of agreement that would qualify under Article 98 (2), and 
cannot trump any obligations under the Rome Statute."); Steffen Wirth, Immunities, Related 
Problems, and Article 98 of the Rome Statute, 12 CRIM. L.F. 429 (2001). 
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obligations of States Parties under the future ICC Statute and existing 
obligations of States Parties under international law .160 
Article 98, paragraph 1, deal exclusively with the limited question of the 
relationship between the obligations of States Parties to the ICC Statute 
and their prior obligations under customary or conventional international 
law concerning diplomatic immunities and State immunities, particularly 
those incorporated in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. 161 
On the other hand, Article 98 paragraph 2 was intended to address the 
question of the effect of the ICC Statute on existing Status of Forces 
Agreements (SOFAs).162 As explained by Hans-Peter Kaul and Claus 
Kress, both members of the German delegation, Article 98 (2) was de-
signed to address possible - not certain - conflicts between existing obli-
gations under SOFAs and under the ICC Statute: 
The idea behind the provision [Article 98 (2)] was to solve legal 
conflicts which might arise because of Status of Forces Agree-
ments which are already in place. On the contrary, Article 98 (2) 
was not designed to create an incentive for (future) States Parties 
to conclude Status of Forces Agreements which amount to an 
obstacle to the execution of requests for cooperation issued by 
the Court. 163 
Similarly, Kimberly Prost, a member of the Canadian delegation, and 
Angelika Schlunck, a member of the German delegation, have noted that 
160. u.s. Efforts to Obtain Immunity Agreement, supra note 159, at 7. Article 98 (cooperation 
with respect to waiver of immunity and consent to surrender) reads: 
I. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would 
require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international 
law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a third 
State, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of that third State for the waiver of 
the immunity. 
2. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the 
requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements 
pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is required to surrender a person of that 
State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of the sending State 
for the giving of consent for the surrender. 
ICC Statute, supra note I, art. 98(1 )(2). 
161. u.s. Efforts to Obtain Immunity Agreement, supra note 159, at 7. William A. Schabas, 
supra note 38, at 92; See also, BRUCE BROOMHALL, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RULE OF LAW 145 (2003); 
John T. Holmes, Complementarity: National Courts Versus the ICC, in I THE ROME STATUTE: A 
COMMENTARY, supra note 143, at 667. 
162. U.S. EFFORTS TO OBTAIN IMMUNITY AGREEMENT, supra note 159, at 7. 
163. Hans-Peter Kaul and Claus Kress, supra note 143, at 165. See also, Christopher Keith 
Hall, The First Five Sessions of the UN Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal 
Court, 94 A.J.I.L. 773, 786 n.36 (2000) (noting that Article 98 (2) was added to address existing 
agreements on status of forces). 
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States were concerned with existing international obligations when draft-
ing Article 98. 164 Thus, "it would be very hard indeed to concede by way 
of an interpretative statement that a State Party acted in confonnity with 
its obligation to 'fully cooperate' with the Court in concluding [a] new 
Statu[s] of Forces Agreement to this effect."165 
However, even if Article 98 (2) were to be construed by the Court to 
apply to renewed SOFAs and new SOFAs entered into by States Parties 
to the ICC Statute, these agreements would have to be consistent with the 
object and purpose of the Statute, as well as with other rules of 
international law. 166 The object and purpose of the ICC Statute is to end 
immunity by ensuring that no one is above the law and immune from the 
law of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. 167 Article 98 
"immunity" agreements are what their name implies - an immunity of 
U.S. nationals from the Court's jurisdiction. Therefore, to the extent that 
the immunity agreement is intended to insulate certain persons from the 
Court's jurisdiction, the immunity agreement is inconsistent with the 
object and purpose of the ICC Statute. States Parties to the ICC Statute 
should therefore not enter into such immunity agreements as they are 
obligated to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose 
of the treaty. 168 
164. Kimberly Prost & Ange1ika Sch1unck, Article 98, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE By ARTICLE II31 (Otto 
Triffterer, ed.,1999) ("All States participating in the negotiations in Rome had concerns about 
conflicts with existing international obligations. Thus, there are several provisions within Part 9, 
including those in Articles 90, 93 para. 9 and 98 which address that concern. ... Even States which 
advocated for a strong Court were concerned about actions taken pursuant to this Statute, which 
would violate these existing fundamental obligations at international law."). 
165. Hans-Peter Kaul and Claus Kress, supra'note 143, at 174. 
166. U.S. Efforts to Obtain Immunity Agreement, supra note 159, at 9 (citing the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 121, art. 31(1». Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties provides that: "[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with 
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its 
object and purpose." 
167. ICC Statute, supra note 1, preamble, para. 5, art. 27(1). Article 27(1) provides that: 
This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official 
capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of 
a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a Government official shall in 
no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in 
and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence. 
168. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 121, art. 18 ("A state is obliged to 
refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty ... "). See, Judy Dempsey, 
Accords with US 'Will Violate' ICC Treaty, FINANCIAL TiMES, 27 Aug. 2002, (referring to the text 
of the legal opinion of European Union's legal experts which concluded that a: 
[Clontracting Party to the statute concluding such an agreement with the US acts against 
the object and purpose of the statute and thereby violates its general obligation to perform 
the obligations of the statutes in good faith. . .. [a contracting Party's] legal obligation 
vis-a-vis its co-contracting parties and the Court to surrender a person to the Court upon 
request cannot be modified by concluding an agreement of the kind proposed by the US. 
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Furthennore, the conclusion of immunity agreements between States 
Parties to the ICC Statute and the United States or any other State is 
questionable, as it contradicts the customary international law principle 
of pacta sunt servanda, which obligates a State Party to a treaty not to do 
anything that will undermine its treaty obligations. '69 Besides, the valid-
ity of these bilateral immunity agreements are doubtful considering that 
they were procured under coercion'70 and/or by threat l7l of withdrawal of 
military aid, including education, training, and financing the purchases of 
equipment and weaponry if the States failed to sign the immunity agree-
ments.172 
Also, the immunity agreements are void because they contradict a pri-
mary norm of pacta sunt servandal73 which is undoubtedly universally 
recognized as a peremptory nonn of customary international law. '74 
States Parties to the ICC agreed in Article 88 to "ensure that there are 
procedures available under their national law for all fonns of coopera-
tion" listed in Part 9 of the Rome Statute. Therefore, any national 
legislation, procedures or practices which would delay or obstruct full 
cooperation with the Court would be inconsistent with States Parties' 
obligations under the ICC Statute. 175 
Thus, since States Parties to the ICC have an affinnative duty to comply 
immediately with requests by the ICC to arrest and surrender accused 
persons in their territories,176 they should be concluding agreements that 
will expedite this obligation. However, the essence of these bilateral trea-
ties with the United States is to insulate U.S. nationals from the jurisdic-
169. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 121, art. 26 ("Every treaty in force 
is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith"). 
170. The expression of a State's consent to be bound by a treaty which has been procured by the 
coercion of its representative through acts or threats directed against him shall be without any legal 
effect. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 121, art.51, 52 
171. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 121, art. 52 ("A treaty is void if its 
conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of interna-
tionallaw embodied in the Charter of the United Nations"). 
172. See Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Ties Military Aid to Peacekeepers' Immunity, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 10,2002, at AI. 
173. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 121, art. 53 provides: 
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of 
general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory 
norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international 
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and 
which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the 
same character. 
174. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 121, preamble, para 3, (noting 
that the principles of free consent and of good faith and the pacta sunt servanda rule are universally 
recognized). 
175. Checklist for Effective Implementation, supra note 22, at 9. 
176. ICC Statute, supra note I, art. 59(1). 
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tion of the ICC, which will directly affect the ability of the Court to 
prosecute those accused of committing international crimes. The ICC 
was created to ensure that anyone, irrespective of his or her position, who 
commits international crime, is held accountable for his or her actions. 
Therefore, there is no doubt that State Parties to the ICC are violating 
their international obligations under the Statute by signing such immu-
nity agreements and that such violations could lead to a finding of non-
cooperation pursuant to Article 87, paragraph 7.177 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The highlighted bottlenecks in the Court's effective exercise of jurisdic-
tion are by no means exhaustive. Due to sovereignty concerns, some of 
the noted impediments were not mere oversights, but compromises that 
had to be made in order to gather enough support to establish the Court. 
After the establishment of the ICC, it is very unlikely that the interna-
tional community may establish another ad hoc international or hybrid 
criminal tribunal to prosecute persons accused of international crimes. 178 
Thus, the continued application of international individual criminal re-
sponsibility rests with the Court. It is therefore imperative that the Court 
be endowed with sufficient personal jurisdiction in order to ensure that 
perpetrators of egregious international crimes do not go unpunished. 
While there is nothing to suggest that these sovereignty concerns are 
waning, it is nevertheless imperative that the international community 
ensure the effective operation of the Court and enable the Court to 
achieve its stated objective. Fortunately, there is an expectation from 
States Parties that the ICC Statute requires further elaboration as re-
flected by the requirement to review the Statute within seven years of 
entry into force. 179 
A meaningful review of the ICC Statute should consider amending the 
operation of the complementarity principle at least to grant the Court 
primary jurisdiction over the crime of genocide180 and certain categories 
of offenders who by virtue of their official position are unlikely to be 
177. Checklist for Effective Implementation, supra note 22, at 9. 
178. For instance, instead of establishing another ad hoc tribunal in the Sudan, the Security 
Council chose to refer the situation in Darfur to the Court. 
179. ICC Statute, supra note I, art. 123. 
180. See Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, Report of the International Law 
Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, 
U.N. Doc. N49/10 (1994) art. 21 (prescribing inherent jurisdiction to the ICC only for the crime of 
genocide); 10han D. van der Vyver, Personal and Territorial Jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court, 14 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 1.20 (2000) (noting that the United States was willing to 
concede "inherent jurisdiction" of the ICC in regard to the crime of genocide). 
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genuinely prosecuted domestically.181 The application of complementar-
ity principle serves as a labyrinth capable of rendering the Court otiose. 
Thus, the complementarity principle remains a viable threat to the future 
of the international criminal system and the effectiveness of the Court. 
Also, it is worrisome that States may, under the guise of complementar-
ity, shield their nationals from the Court and only selectively refer situa-
tions or surrender accused persons to the Court that it does not want to 
deal with. 182 This kind of selective referral by States may unwittingly 
expose the Court to accusations of aiding the State to pursue its vendetta 
against perceived opponents. A perception of the Court as an avenue to 
pursue victor's justice will not augur well for the image of the Court. 
Furthermore, States Parties at the next review conference should delete 
Article 124 from the Statute because its retention sends a dangerous sig-
nal that it is okay to commit war crimes for seven years before account-
ability can be attributed. Equally, Article 16 should be deleted from the 
ICC Statute. The idea that the Security Council may block the Court's 
jurisdiction is troubling as it is an invitation for political meddling in 
judiciary function. It puts the independence and credibility of the Court 
at issue. At the same time, it exposes the Court to allegations of western 
dominance. There is no doubt that an effective and independent judici-
ary can only be achieved when courts are institutionally shielded from 
direct political influence. Independence of the judiciary is a sine qua non 
to an effective and credible national court. 
There is no reason why the ICC Statute, which exerts its independent 
status, should not confer unfettered independence on the Court's exercise 
of jurisdiction. 183 It is an irony that while the ICC is not an organ of the 
181. Such amendment would draw from the Statute of the Sierra Leone which restricted the 
primacy jurisdiction of the tribunals to "those who bear the greatest responsibility" for the atrocities. 
See The Statute for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 1, as amended, annexed to the Secretary-
General's Sierra Leone Report, available at: <http://www.un.orgIDocs/sc!reports/2000/915e.pdf>, 
also available at: <http://www.sc-sl.org!scsl-statute.html>. 
182. Claus Kress, 'Self-Referrals' and 'Waivers of Complementarity' Some Considerations in 
Law and Policy, 2 J. 1Nr'L. CRIM. Jus. 944, 946 (2004) (noting that States may embark on 'selective 
or asymmetrical self-referral' where the de jure Government is itself Party to an internal" armed 
conflict). 
183. See ICC Statute, supra note 4, art. 2; Relationship Agreement Between the United Nations 
and the International Criminal Court, Oct. 4, 2004, UN Doc. Al58/874, U.N. Doc. 
PCNICCI20011l/Add.l, preamble 4, U.N. Doc. Al58/874, annex (2004) (entered into force Oct. 4, 
2004). (Preamble 4 to the Relationships Agreement states expressly that "the International Criminal 
Court is established as an independent permanent institution in relationship with the United Na-
tions."). Thus, the ICC is not a specialized agency of the UN nor does it otherwise belong to the 
"UN Family." For a discussion on the earlier draft of the Relationship Agreement, see Daryl A. 
Mundis, The Assembly of States Parties and the Institutional Framework of the International Crimi-
nal Court, 97 A.J.I.L. 132 (2003). 
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United Nations, it nevertheless submits itself to the direction of the UN 
Security Council. Should the Security Council be allowed to prevent 
ICC investigations or prosecutions willy nilly, this will violate the princi-
ple of prosecutorial independence. l84 
This study argues unequivocally that the conclusion of bilateral immu-
nity agreements between States Parties and the U.S. which serves to in-
sulate U.S. nationals from the Court's jurisdiction is indubitably a viola-
tion of the obligations of States Parties under the ICC Statute. Such im-
munity agreements fly in opposition to the States Parties' obligations 
under the ICC Statute. Therefore, there is the need to discourage States 
Parties from concluding the so called "Article 98" immunity agreement. 
Without States Parties' assistance and cooperation to surrender accused 
persons to the Court, the Prosecutor and the Court will face a formidable 
challenge in discharging the objective of the ICC Statute. The Office of 
the Prosecutor and the Court will constantly be confronted with a special 
problem and will need to make special efforts to ensure the ready and 
voluntary support and cooperation of States Parties. 
Thus, while it is the position of this author that the provisions of Article 
98 clearly reflect an intent to protect existing SOFAs agreements, it now 
appears necessary to redraft Article 98 at the next review conference to 
remove any perceived ambiguity that supports the contention that it ex-
tends beyond existing SOFAs. 
The obstacles highlighted above do not detract from the efforts of the 
delegates at the Rome Conference that made the establishment of the 
ICC possible nor do they ignore the political dynamics associated with 
negotiating international treaties. Rather, this paper invites the interna-
tional community to demonstrate its support for the Court by mustering 
the political will to cooperate fully with the Court and free the Court 
from the inherent bottlenecks in the Statute that lessen the effectiveness 
of the Court. 
184. Bartram S. Brown, supra note 51, 389. 
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